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AN ANOMALY IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
A. C.

UMBIZEIT,

A.M., LL.B.*

S

INCE the beginning of the present century there has been developed
a body of "legal principles which settle the conflicting claims of
executive or administrative authority on the one side, and of individual
or private right on the other."' This body of legal principles has been
called "the conspicuous feature of our American Law" by Dean Pound
of Harvard, who also states that the practical application of these principles "appears to have very much in it of a reversion to a primitive
justice without law." Freund has also designated this modern feature
of our jurisprudence as the exercise of "unstandardized power" (practically unrestrained power); in other words, both of these authorities
strongly suggest the thought that administrative law provides a short cut
to the securing of individualized justice.
The observer of modern jurisprudence readily notes the great multiplication of administrative tribunals in almost every state of the Union
as well as in the nation. It almost appears as though some new administrative tribunal is created somewhere every day and existing
administrative tribunals are given new powers every week. Considering
the rapid development of this new branch of governmental activity, the
anomaly of the situation consists in the fact that neither the federal nor
our Wisconsin Constitution, contain a provision which even by direct
inference justifies the creation of these administrative boards and the
performance of functions that have been committed to them by the
legislature. The American Government, both federal and state, is
primarily a constitutional government, the important functions of which
are grounded upon positive provisions of the fundamental law of the
land. The constitutions provide that the executive, legislative and
judiciary be co-equal, thus creating what has been called a government
of checks and balances. Yet, an examination of our political and legislative history shows that these three departments have never been
actually co-equal, but either one or the other of them was a little ahead
* Professor at Marquette University School of Law.
'Freund on Administrative Law, page I.
ED.-The author is considering the development of the idea that the field now
covered by Administrative Law by the three recognized departments of the government, might more properly and effectively be centralized into a new and separate department. An article of this nature by the author will appear in the
R viaw in a subsequent issue.
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of the rest. In the beginning of our constitutional history, the legislative branch was considered as the most important branch of the government because it pre-eminently represented the people and the
judiciary and executive were held immediately answerable to the legislature and only remotely to the people. After the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment the superiority of the legislature was replaced
by the superiority of the judiciary and for a time it was held that no
executive act amounted to much unless its validity had been inquired
into judicially. Almost every legislative act was subject to the challenge
of constitutionality in the courts and during this period we find that
the most important work of the government was done by the judiciary,
but since the beginning of this century the importance of the legislative
and of the judiciary seems to have disappeared and we now find that
the great bulk of governmental activity in the states and in the nation
is performed by what, for want of a better term, has been called the
administrative branch of government, although this is a misnomer and
in no way describes the real character of the functions performed by
this department.
It is well recognized by all familiar at all with this new branch of our
jurisprudence that these administrative bodies perform legislative,
judicial and administrative functions and in the performance of these
functions come in contact with practically every citizen of the country.
Many persons have gone through life without getting into a court of
justice, but it is practically impossible now to avoid contact with some
administrative authority no matter in what walk of life we may travel.
None of us can avoid coming in contact, or even conflict, with the traffic
officers on the street corners.
How extensively administrative activity has entered into the social,
economic, industrial and political life of the nation appears when you
glance at the multifarious agencies the federal and state governments
have created to regulate and control the conduct of the individual for
the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community. Thus the
federal government has created and maintains an interstate commerce
commission, a federal trade commission, a railroad labor board and
other similar bodies, exercising vast powers and carrying grave responsibilities. In the states we have examining boards and other bodies
to pass on the competency, responsibility, or other qualifications of
private schools, chauffeurs, engineers, surveyors, private detectives, real
estate brokers, stockbrokers, teachers, chiropodists, nurses, public accountants, shorthand reporters, physicians and surgeons, midwives,
peddlers, lawyers, dentists, pharmacists, plumbers, undertakers, embalmers, veterinarians, optometrists, architects, employees of the state
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and its civil divisions, and other professions, trades and callings; also
boards and commissioners of education, public service commissions,
probation commissions, parol boards, athletic commissions to regulate
boxing and wrestling contests, racing commissions, bank examiners,
insurance departments, transit commissions, health boards with divisions
for the safeguarding of motherhood, saving of infant life, and instruction in child hygiene, child welfare boards, tax commissions, tenement
house commissions, building commissions, water power commissions,
water control commissions, commissions for the blind and for mental
defectives, recreation commissions, boards of charities, agricultural
commissions with power to grant indemnities for diseased animals destroyed and for animals killed by dogs, conservation commissions,
boards of child welfare for the granting of mothers' allowances, and
motion picture commissions.
The anomalous feature of this immense field of governmental activity
consists in the fact that all of the foregoing enumerated functions of
government have been instituted and are being maintained without any
direct authority therefor in either the federal or state constitutions as
already suggested. The federal Constitution does not even provide for
administrative officers, but makes provision only for a President and
Vice President to constitute the executive department. It has been suggested by our own Supreme Court2 that, since the Constitution of the
United States gives Congress power to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the powers of that instrument vested
in the government of the United States or in any department or officer
thereof 3 this is the source of the authority for Congress to enact administrative legislation. The Constitution of Wisconsin does contain
an article providing for administrative officers 4 but even those provisions
have reference to mere ministerial duties, such as keeping the records
of the state, auditing accounts and the like, and make no suggestion
whatever that officers created under this article are to have supervisory
control over the individual affairs of the citizen.
It has been suggested that the creation of what is known as the administrative function of the government is but the exercise of the police
power of the nation because such exercise is not only for the purpose
of prohibiting and punishing, but also for regulating and supervising
the conduct of the citizen. This suggestion adds only another anomaly
to the exercise of administrative jurisprudence, at least as far as the
'Minn. St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Wis., 136 Wis. 146-6o,
116 N.W. 9o5.
'U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, Sub. i8.
'Wis. Const. Art. VI.
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federal government is concerned. It has been uniformly held in the
federal and the state courts that the federal government possesses no
police power but that the exercise of such power was reserved to the
states under the Constitution-"a power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under the Constitution.""
In passing, let it be suggested that the scope of the police power is
most elastic. No court has ever dared to define it. No administrative
board or tribunal seems to hesitate to exercise it.
Shall we be alarmed because of this unstandardized growing power
of administrative justice in our body politic? It cannot be denied that
there are certain dangers involved in telling people what to do and what
not to do by special directions for a particular case rather than by general rules. Telling people in advance what they may do and what they
may not do in any given case is an experiment and all experiments involve certain dangers. Our administrative commissions and tribunals
are like our traffic officers who give us signals to tell us when to cross
and when not to cross and where to cross and jaywalking is prohibited.
Nevertheless, the increased importance of administrative justice is
nothing more than the natural result of the evolution we have been
passing through, economically, socially and industrially. This administrative movement in the law is simply a part of that general
movement to deal with the individual as a concrete human being and not
as an abstract individual. We are beginning to appreciate the importance of the human equation not only in our social affairs but also in
economic, industrial and political relations. Points of contact between
the individuals of a community are much more numerous than they
were in the days of our fathers. The greatest danger in the continually
expanding power of the exercise of administrative justice lies in the
predominant tendency to regulate and control by legislation these points
of contact between the individuals in the complex organization of society as it exists today.
It is not our purpose herein to discuss the dangers of this new system of administering justice determining the rights between man and
man and between man and his government, or to suggest a remedy or
remedies for evils already existing, or that threaten for the future. The
American people seem to be determined to stake their faith on legislation as a cure for economic, social and industrial evils and appear to
be satisfied to grant plenary administrative power to tribunals and commissions to supplement legislative and judicial action and to leave the
result to the future.
lacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. M.

WHAT IS NEGOTIABILITY?
CLIFTON WILLIAMS*

T

HE word "negotiable" is a magic word. Whether or not an instrument is negotiable or is merely assignable raises the full force of
the magic that is performed if the instrument is in fact negotiable in
form and is negotiated to a holder in due course. Some of the simple
illustrations will provoke thoughts which will clearly portray this difference.
If an ordinary contract is made between D and X, and assigned by
X to P, P may sue D upon the contract but P is subject to all of the
defenses which D had against X. A simple illustration is as follows:
SUIT ON THE CONTRACT

CONT

TGASSIGNMENT

ANY DEFENSE

However, if the instrument was negotiable in form, having all of the
five requirements in Section 116.o2 (being the Wisconsin section number of the Uniform Negotiable Act on the necessary form of the instrument), and if all of the five requirements of the holder in due course
statute (being Section 116.57 of the Wisconsin Statutes), apply to the
case, then the uniform negotiable instrument law (or the old law merchant prior thereto,) erects a wall, so to speak, between the holder and
the maker so that the holder may sue the maker from the point of advantage and the wall prevents the maker's defenses from getting at the
holder. If any of the requirements of the two statutes just mentioned
are absent or defective, there is immediately a hole in the wall through
which the defenses may be hurled at the holder. As the law has been
changed in Wisconsin, there is one defense which seems to be always
* Professor
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ACTION ON THE NOTE

S UI T

MAKER

PAYEE

ANY DEFENSE

THERE IS ONE
OPENING HERE
FOR A DEFENSEIF
THE INSTRUMENT
IS VOID UNDER
LASTSENTENCE IN

§,116s.60

*i5.

1.

IN WRITING AND SIGNED

2.

UNCONDITIONAL PROMISE OR
ORDER TO PAY SUM CERTAIN
IN MONEY

3.

PAYABLE ON DEMAND OR AT
FIXED OR DETERMINABLE FUTURE TIME

4.

PAYABLE TO ORDER OR BEARER

5.

DRAWEE NAMED

1.

COMPLETE AND REGULAR ON ITS FACE

2.

BECAME HOLDER BEFORE DUE AND
WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY PREVIOUS
DISHONOR

3.

THAT HE TOOK IT IN GOOD FAITH AND
FOR VALUE

4.

NO NOTICE OF INFIRMITY OR DEFECT OF
TITLE
BUIES HE TOOK IT IN USUAL COURSE OF
THAT

INDORSEE
OR
HOLDER

§ 116.02
STATUTES

116.57
STATUTES
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open to the maker and that is in the last sentence of Section x16.6o,
which provides that
"title of the holder is absolutely void when such instrument or signature was so procured from the person who did not know the nature
of the instrument and could not have obtained such knowledge by the
use of ordinary care."
This defense is practically limited to the state of Wisconsin. If the
endorsee or holder is behind the perfect wall erected by the two statutes
mentioned above, then Section 116.62 of the Statutes provides as
follows :
,.a holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties
among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the
full amount thereof against all patties liable thereon except (immaterial
provisions as to the insurance premiums) and except also in cases
where the title of the person negotiating such instrument is void under
the provisions of Section 1i6.6o of this act."
(Now assuming that an action may go up and over and that a defense must either go straight through or down we might illustrate the
proposition as follows:
It is to be noted that Section 116.62 above quoted, says that the holder
may enforce payment against "all persons liable thereon." Now, there
are two additional possible defenses which are not mentioned in that
statute in connection with the "void" defense pictured above. Section
116.27 reads as follows:

"where a signature is forged or made without the authority of the
person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and
no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge thereof, or to
enforce payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired
through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is
sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery
or want of authority."
Section 117.42 of the statutes reads as follows:
"where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent
of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who
has himself made, authorized or assented, orally or in writing, to the
alteration and subsequent endorsers."
These two statutes last quoted are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of Section 116.62 quoted above which says that the holder in
due course holds the instrument free from all defenses excepting the
"void" defense under Section 116.6o. This inconsistency in the statutes,
however, was not the purpose of this article. The purpose of this article
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was to suggest to the law student some method of comprehending the
real effect of the word "negotiable" and the importance of the-various
requirements to bring about the magic word of negotiability so that the
holder may be a holder in due course.
Now, suppose the instrument was not payable to order or bearer,
there immediately is a hole through the fourth stone in the top part of
the wall, and any defense which was good between the original parties
may be hurled right through and will be good against the holder, which
of course prevents the holder from being a holder in due course and prevents the magic word of negotiability from operating. The same is true
of any other of the five requirements of the law on "form." Likewise,
suppose that the holder secured the instrument after it was due on its
face; then there is immediately a hole through the second stone in the
base of the wall, through which any defense may be hurled. A similar
situation arises if any of the five requirements of the law on "holder in
due course" are defective. In Wisconsin, likewise, if an instrument
is void because it was secured from a person who did not know the
nature of the instrument and could not have obtained such knowledge
by the use of ordinary Qare (Sec. 116.6o), then there is a by-pass under
the wall through which the defenses may be hurled. In most states the
wall stands between a holder in due course and the maker without the
by-pass just mentioned.

